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What exPlains the market 
reaCtion t0 divestitUre
announcements?
Divestitures represent a potent form of corporate 
restructuring. Firms can use divestitures together 
with acquisitions to reshuffle their portfolio of assets. 
Business units generating poor returns may be sold 
to more efficient producers (Maksimovic and Phillips 
2001). In addition, divestitures allow firms to trim their 
production capacity following a negative demand 
shock (Warusawitharana 2008). As other producers 
may be able to extract a higher value from the assets 
because of better fit or greater economies of scale, 
divestitures ensure that economic resources are put 
to their best use (Hearth and Zaima 1984; Hite et 
al. 1987). In effect, divestitures contribute to more 
efficient capital allocation. Under certain conditions, 
firms may also find that it is cheaper to divest assets 
for the purpose of raising funds instead of issuing 
equity (Lang et al. 1995). Altogether, the above 
arguments suggest that divestiture announcements 
should be associated with a significant increase in the 
seller’s share price. 
In this paper, we analyse the market reaction to 
divestiture announcements made by Australian firms 
listed on the ASX over the period from 1990 to 2010. 
Most studies deal with US firms. In their review paper, 
Eckbo and Thorburn (2008) indicate that sellers 
experience positive abnormal returns of 1.2 per cent 
on average. The market reaction is usually stronger 
for highly leveraged firms since the funds raised 
through divestitures enable the sellers to reduce 
their cost of financial distress (Lang et al. 1995). Poor 
operating performance is also associated with higher 
abnormal returns. In addition, John and Ofek (1995) 
highlight the fact that divestitures leading to greater 
focus generate significantly higher returns and 
improved operating performance. 
In Australia, Cooney et al. (2004) report positive 
excess returns for a sample of divestitures announced 
in the 1990s. However, only the divestitures of non-
core assets appear to generate significant returns. 
In the multivariate regressions, none of the firm 
characteristics is found to be significant. We extend 
their study to the past 10 years using a comprehensive 
sample sourced from  Thomson Reuters’ SDC 
Platinum. Our second contribution comes from the 
application of quantile regressions to differentiate 
the influence of the explanatory variables at different 
points in the distribution of excess returns. Unlike 
ordinary least-squares, quantile regressions are robust 
to outliers and allow for the possibility that the effect 
of the explanatory variables differs systematically 
with the size of the dependent variable. More subtle 
relationships can thus be revealed.2  
Our results show that divesting firms achieve 
abnormal returns of about 1.8 per cent in the three-
day period surrounding the announcement. High 
leverage and low operating performance only 
contribute to higher returns when the market reacts 
favourably to the divestiture. On the other hand, the 
influence of these variables is insignificant when the 
market reacts negatively. In any case, the divestitures 
of non-core assets are not associated with higher 
returns, contrary to results reported in the past. 
Methodology and sample description
We use standard event study methodology to 
compute abnormal returns (Brown and Warner 
1985). The stock returns of divesting firms around 
the announcement are adjusted for broader market 
movements using the market model. In line with 
Cooney et al. (2004) we use the All Ordinaries Index 
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Our data source is  Thomson Reuters’ SDC Platinum. 
We select all divestitures by Australian firms announced 
between January 1990 and December 2010. Following 
previous studies, firms in the financial services sector 
(SIC 6000-6999) are excluded. To obtain more 
reliable results, we require the divestiture to be worth 
at least $10 million and the seller to have more than 
$50 million in total assets. In comparison, John and 
Ofek (1995) select divestitures worth more than $100 
million. We then collect daily stock prices around the 
announcement date using Datastream. After dropping 
observations with incomplete data, our final sample is 
represented by a total of 402 divestitures. 
Table 1 indicates that the average divestiture in the 
sample is valued at about $190 million. However, 
the result is highly skewed by the presence of a few 
large transactions. The largest divestiture is the sale 
of Origin Energy’s coal seam gas division to US-
based Conoco Phillips for over $9.7 billion in 2008. 
Otherwise, half of the transactions are worth less than 
$50 million. About 78 per cent of the divested assets 
operate outside the seller’s main business segment. 
Their relative size is small with a median value 
representing only 3.1 per cent of the seller’s assets. 
Divesting firms are generally large with an average 
of $6.5 billion in total assets. Their leverage is also 
relatively high with total liability representing about 
55 per cent of total assets. Operating performance 
appears to be relatively low with an average return 
on assets of about 3.6 per cent. Furthermore, the 
magnitude of the standard deviation suggests 
that a significant proportion of firms have a 
negative operating performance. Hence, a number 
of divestitures in our sample may be driven by 
financial distress. 
Empirical results
Our first step is to evaluate whether divestitures 
create value for the seller. Table 2 shows the 
abnormal returns in the 11-day window around 
the announcement date. Most of the returns are 
as a proxy for the market portfolio. The coefficients 
of the market model are estimated over the period 
(-250, -10) days before the announcement. Abnormal 
returns are given by the difference between realised 
and expected returns in the 11-day window around 
the announcement date. The value generated by 
the divestiture is measured by the seller’s cumulated 
abnormal returns over a three-day window. 
The explanatory variables consist of the divesting 
firm’s leverage, operating performance and expected 
change in focus. Leverage is proxied by total liability 
over total assets. Highly leveraged firms are likely to 
suffer from high distress costs. In particular, they may 
have to pass up potentially valuable projects due to 
a prohibitive cost of capital or the inability to raise 
external funds (Myers and Majluf 1984). Operating 
performance is measured by operating profits before 
tax over total assets. Poor performers are more likely 
to improve their performance since divestitures help 
resolve overcapacity and sort out unproductive 
investments (Maksimovic and Phillips 2001; 
Warusawitharana 2008). This variable is thus expected 
to have a negative influence on abnormal returns. Our 
proxy for change in focus is whether the divested unit 
operates in a different industry compared to the firm’s 
main business. John and Ofek (1995) demonstrate that 
increased focus is associated with improved operating 
performance and higher abnormal returns. Cooney 
et al. (2004) confirm that only this type of divestiture 
leads to higher share prices in Australia. 
In the regression analysis, we include the relative 
size of the divestiture measured by the value of the 
divested asset over the seller’s total assets. Large 
divestitures are expected to have a greater impact 
on the firm’s market value of equity than small 
transactions. For instance, Mulherin and Boone 
(2000), Alexandrou and Sundarsanam (2001) and 
Hanson and Song (2006) find significantly higher 
excess returns for larger divestitures. In the same vein, 
John and Ofek (1995) show that the market reaction is 
a decreasing function of the firm’s market value.
Notes: Relative size is with respect to the seller’s total assets. Non-core indicates that the divested asset is outside the seller’s 
main business segment. Leverage is total liability over total assets. ROA is operating profits before tax over total assets. The 
Herfindahl index is calculated using segment sales. The number of business segments is based on four-digit SIC codes. 
 mEAN  STD DEv  Q1 mEDIAN Q3
Panel A: Divestiture characteristics
Value (A$ million) 191.0 679.4 19.6 49.1 130.0
Relative size  0.173 0.727 0.009 0.031 0.133
Non-core asset 0.779 0.416 1 1 1
Panel B: Divesting firm characteristics
Assets (A$ million)  6,530 13,139 479 2,200 6,697
Leverage  0.550 0.155 0.480 0.553 0.629
ROA  0.036 0.120 0.016 0.055 0.091
Herfindahl  0.572 0.283 0.325 0.509 0.820
N segments 5.799 3.714 3 5 8
 TABLE 1: Summary statistics for divestiture sample
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greater impact on the seller’s value. However, the 
influence of leverage and operating performance 
is not statistically significant. This seems surprising 
given that divestitures provide firms with fresh cash 
that can help them pay their debts and reduce the 
costs of financial distress. In addition, divestitures 
circumvent the need to issue new equity and dilute 
historical shareholders. Similarly, despite the fact 
that the divestiture would increase the firm’s focus by 
removing an asset unrelated to its core business, it is 
not associated with higher returns.
The median regression may provide a different outcome. 
In contrast to ordinary least-squares where deviations 
from the mean are squared, the slopes are estimated 
using the absolute deviation from the median for each 
of the explanatory variables. Therefore, outliers have a 
smaller influence compared to ordinary least-squares. 
insignificant, except on the day of the announcement 
and the following day. Over a short three-day window, 
cumulated abnormal returns amount to about  
1.8 per cent. Cooney et al. (2004) report a similar 
result in Australia for an earlier period. The proportion 
of positive abnormal returns is also significantly higher 
on the announcement day and the following day. This 
confirms the perception that shareholders tend to 
benefit from divestitures. However, the results also 
indicate that not all divestitures elicit a positive market 
reaction. In fact, more than four divestitures out of 10 
are associated with negative cumulated returns. 
Our next step is to identify which divestitures 
create more value. Table 3 includes the results of 
four regressions involving the same explanatory 
variables. The ordinary least-squares regression 
shows that larger divestitures tend to have a 
DAy AvERAGE  PROPORTION > 0l
Panel A: Abnormal returns
t – 5 -0.217* 0.4776 
t  – 4 -0.101 0.4652 
t – 3 -0.158 0.4826 
t – 2 -0.161 0.4851 
t – 1 0.106 0.4527 
t   0.837*** 0.5597***
t + 1 0.873*** 0.5348**
t + 2 -0.008 0.4776 
t + 3 -0.246 0.4577 
t + 4 0.143 0.4776 
t + 5 -0.117 0.4701*
Panel B: Cumulated abnormal returns
CAR -1,0 0.943*** 0.5373**
CAR  -1,+1 1.816*** 0.5721***
CAR  -5,+5 0.952* 0.5174*
Notes: Abnormal returns are estimated using the market model. Significance is based on the t-test for abnormal returns and the 
Wilcoxon signed test for the proportion of positive returns. 
 
TABLE 2: Estimates of abnormal returns around divestiture announcement
DEPENDENT vARIABLE IS CAR -1,+1Panel A: Abnormal returns
 QuANTILE REGRESSIONS
 OLS   median  25th  75th 
Intercept 0.0309 0.0029 -0.0236*** 0.0232**
 (1.49) (0.48) (-2.71) (2.17) 
Relative size 0.007*** 0.0042***  0.0005 0.0096***
 (3.48) (5.08) (0.40) (6.21) 
Leverage  0.0297 0.0255*** 0.0088 0.0841***
 (1.07) (2.63) (0.66) (4.99) 
ROA  -0.1112 0.0047 0.0245 -0.0897***
 (-1.63) (0.37) (1.45) (-3.76) 
Non-core -0.0008 0.0034 0.0082 0.0082 
 (-0.07) (0.94) (1.58) (1.31) 
R2 | Pseudo R2  0.0621  0.0165  0.0059  0.0717  
Notes: A natural log transformation is applied to relative size.  
T-statistics are indicated between brackets. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.
 
TABLE 3: Determinants of excess returns
JASSA The Finsia Journal of applied Finance Issue 1 2013    31
significantly higher returns. From the least-squares 
regression, high leverage and poor operating 
performance, which represent conventional motives 
to divest, do not appear to explain the cross-sectional 
difference in excess returns. However, this is due to 
a strong asymmetry in the market reaction. Large 
positive abnormal returns are significantly related 
to the leverage and performance of divesting 
firms, while large negative abnormal returns are 
explained by totally different factors that remain 
to be uncovered. Finally, we find that refocusing 
divestitures are not associated with higher returns 
contrary to the results found in earlier studies. ■
Notes
1. The authors wish to thank an anonymous referee and Kevin 
Davis, the Managing Editor, for many helpful comments that 
helped improve this paper.
2. See Koenker and Hallock (2001) for an intuitive presentation 
of quantile regressions. 
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The most notable finding is that leverage becomes 
statistically significant although the coefficient is slightly 
smaller. The influence of leverage is highlighted in the 
recent turmoil experienced by Fortescue (FMG). Pressed 
to streamline its highly geared balance sheet, Australia’s 
third-largest iron ore miner saw its share price rocket 
when it announced it had concluded a series of asset 
sales. There appear to have been two factors motivating 
the buoyant market reaction to the divestiture. First, the 
company would not disrupt its ongoing development 
for lack of cash. Second, the divestiture dispelled the 
prospect of a prohibitive equity issue in order to make 
up for a looming cash shortfall. 
The remaining columns report the results of two 
quantile regressions. The regression at the 25th 
quantile examines the effect of the explanatory 
variables around large negative abnormal returns. 
None of the variables is found to be significant. The 
large negative intercept reflects the fact that the 
focus of the regression is on the left tail of the excess 
returns distribution. Overall, the result implies that 
the negative market reaction is due to other factors. 
The identification of these factors is a subject for 
future research. In contrast, most of the variables 
are highly significant at the 75th quantile. This result 
shows that large positive abnormal returns tend 
to be well explained by the seller’s characteristics. 
In particular, high leverage and low operating 
performance contribute to significantly higher 
abnormal returns. For instance, a 10 per cent increase 
in leverage is associated with a 0.84 per cent higher 
abnormal return. The effect of a 10 per cent decrease 
in return on assets (ROA) is close to 0.9 per cent. 
These impacts are economically large since 10 per 
cent variations are well within one standard deviation 
in either leverage or ROA. 
Across all regressions, the fact that the divestiture is 
expected to increase the seller’s focus by removing 
an asset outside its main business segment does 
not appear to trigger a significantly different market 
reaction. This result is in contrast with earlier findings 
by Cooney et al. (2004) for Australian firms and 
John and Ofek (1995) for US firms. A plausible 
explanation for the discrepancy is that firms used to 
be overdiversified. By eliminating negative synergies, 
refocusing divestitures were perceived in the past as 
creating value. Now that firms have become much 
more focused, reduction in diversification is no longer 
viewed as having the same positive effects. 
Conclusion
In this paper, we provide robust evidence that 
divestitures create shareholder value. Excess 
returns over the three-day period surrounding the 
announcement are about 1.8 per cent. The extent of 
the market reaction clearly depends on the relative 
size of the divested asset. Larger divestitures induce 
